Active investors in capital markets are wealthy and derive a large fraction of their income from the capital they own. I use flow of funds data to construct a consumption expenditure series for these active investors. The volatility of the aggregate consumption growth of active households is much higher than that of aggregate consumption. The resulting stochastic discount factor is tested on the time series and cross section of asset returns and yields reasonable relative risk-aversion coefficient estimates using standard CRRA preferences. I also show that the non-linearity of the Euler-equation is important in understanding asset returns. Furthermore, stock prices do not only react to aggregate shocks but also to redistributional shocks between passive and active households. The results show that constrained and passive households shift a large amount of risk in the economy to active households, resulting in a large equity premium.
Introduction
Assuming the existence of complete markets has been a cornerstone of macroeconomic asset pricing.
However, the consumption of an aggregate investor is not volatile enough to explain the observed equity premium (Mehra and Prescott 1985) , nor can it explain the cross-section of asset returns.
This paper shows that a small number of active and wealthy households do make unconstrained consumption decisions, i.e. their Euler equations, at least in the aggregate, hold. Taking asset prices as given, it seems plausible that these households have simple CRRA utility with reasonable risk aversion coefficient. The estimates yield relative risk aversion of 2-10, a number which is possibly upward biased. The result is evidence for the validity of consumption-based asset pricing, at least for this set of households.
The main innovation of the paper is to use macroeconomic (Flow of Funds) data to identify the consumption series of wealthy, active, unconstrained households. This approach can capture the consumption of households in the economy whose consumption is in general hard to measure, since they are unlikely to respond to surveys. The key insight is that rich active households hold most of their wealth in the form of corporate and non-corporate equity, thus aggregate cash-flow (payout) from these sectors, net of reinvestment, yield a measure of the consumption expenditure of these households. These cash-flows to active households include aggregate dividends, equity and bond repurchases, interest paid, and a wage income proxy for wealthy households. The macro data allows us to net out reinvestment in the asset classes these households are likely to hold. It is important to emphasize that the cash flow series I use is not mechanically linked to equity prices or wealth, even though they comove in equilibrium: e.g. active investors choose to consume more if their perceived wealth is higher. This consumption series is then used in a GMM framework to estimate the Euler equation of these active investors. The paper uses different identifying assumptions to capture the consumption series in question, all of which yield reasonable estimates of risk aversion; the choice of timing convention, however, does matter.
The result is due to the high covariance between market returns and the consumption measures.
The volatility of these consumption series is substantially higher than that of aggregate consumption.
The annual standard deviation of consumption growth is 9-15%, depending on the exact measure. This seemingly contradicts the intuition that it should exactly be these unconstrained wealthy households who are able to smooth their consumption over time the most. Given the volatility of the stock market and the fact that they hold a large fraction of their net worth in equities, it is not inconceivable that their net worth does fluctuate enough to rationalize such a volatile consumption series. This contrasts with the net worth of the average consumer whose major asset is his or her human capital, the value of which is likely to be much less volatile. In fact, it is exactly this high covariance between market returns and the consumption series of active investors, derived from payout measures, that drives the result of this paper (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
It is important to emphasize that this paper does take the theoretical restrictions on the stochastic discount factor seriously, by estimating all asset pricing implications using the Euler equations, not simply a linearized factor model. I also price the the level of returns, not simply excess returns, a restriction on which most asset pricing models fail, as shown by Lewellen et al. (2007) . Also, most consumption based asset pricing papers that base their estimates on Euler equations find that the test of over-identifying restrictions rejects the Euler equation. The Euler equations based on the aggregate consumption expenditure of active households used in this paper, on the other hand, is not rejected.
The paper also shows that the non-linearity of the stochastic discount factor is important to understanding asset prices, especially the equity premium. Since the consumption of active households is volatile, large drops in consumptions are relatively frequent, at least compared to aggregate consumption. A linearized Euler equation cannot capture the surge in the stochastic discount factor in the case of these consumption catastrophes. There are, however, issues with estimating the non-linear Euler equation, especially in the presence of measurement errors: I use Monte Carlo analysis to show that this is unlikely to affect the results substantially.
The key insight of this paper is that active households, including e.g. endowments, do the adjustment for the other households (passive from hereon) who do not actively manage their consumption and their portfolios. Irrespective of the actions of passive households, the Euler equation of active households has to be satisfied: in effect they have to absorb all the risks that passive households are not able or do not want to bear. From this perspective it is irrelevant whether passive households are constrained, shielded from shocks due to institutional arrangements (such as rigid wages), or simply irrational. Thus the paper highlights the importance of extreme heterogeneity among households for understanding asset prices.
Since I do not measure consumption directly, only income net of most of reinvestment, the hardest task is to show that this cash-flow is indeed consumed. I show several pieces of evidence to support this claim. First, I construct different measures of consumption of active agents to show that most of the reinvestment is accounted for in the baseline measure. Active agents have large discretion on when to realize their incomes: the results support the hypothesis that capital gains are only realized when they are intended to be used for consumption. Second, I show that the consumption series comoves with an index of luxury spending, the consumption of which is mostly due to the wealthiest households, and has similar volatility (see Figure 3 ). This again supports the claim that the measures derived from macroeconomic cash flows indeed capture consumption of this group.
The findings of the paper also highlight opportunities for promising further research. In this paper, I do not answer the question of why active households have to bear such a large fraction of aggregate risk: the time-variation in their risk-bearing capacity and the risk that is shifted to them could shed light on the time varying nature of the equity premium. Another related insight is that the consumption of active households does not only vary with aggregate economic activity: some of the shocks to their consumption is purely redistributional, e.g. the large drop around 1969 did not affect aggregate output but was one of the largest disasters for active investors. These results show how the changes in the structure in the economy and the result of political and social processes can have a large impact on equity prices: a promising topic for future research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how this paper relates to previous findings. Section 3 gives the theoretical arguments on how to extract the consumption series of active households from macroeconomic flow of funds data, and gives a detailed account on how the different consumption series are constructed. The results from estimating the Euler equation are presented in Section 4, together with Monte Carlo analysis to check biases due to the small sample and measurement error.
Conclusions and implications for further research are discussed in Section 5.
Related literature
My findings relate to a number of previous papers. Malloy et al. (forthcoming) show that the top third of stockholders in the Consumer Expenditure Survey have much higher consumption volatility than non-stockholders. They find annual consumption volatilities of 12.9% for individual households and 4.1% for the group of top stockholders. The macroeconomic approach I suggest is likely to capture even wealthier households than their study, and the sample period is also much longer. Another major difference is that instead of using simple CRRA preferences, they use Epstein-Zin preferences with a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution and show that a risk-aversion of around 10 can explain the equity premium for stockholders. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2004) show that the consumption of luxury goods is extremely volatile and highly correlated with stock returns, i.e. assuming the households who consume luxuries are the marginal investors, one can explain high expected stock returns using reasonable parameter values of the utility function. However they only look at a small part of consumption, sales of specific luxury items and have relatively short data. Also, given the short sample period, they do not estimate the Euler equation directly, nor do they try to price the levels of returns, which is usually the hardest to match. This paper is also related to that on limited participation. Basak and Cuoco (1998) show in a theoretical model that limited participation, where only a small fraction of consumers hold risky assets, can explain asset prices. They argue that the consumption share of active households should be around 20-30%, which is similar to the values I find in this paper. Allen and Gale (1994) , also in a theoretical model, show that limited participation can explain the volatility of equity prices. Guvenen (2008) argues that the habit level in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) can be understood as the consumption of those who do not participate in the stock market, thus giving an aggregation explanation of the success of the habit-formation model. Chien et al. (2008) show that a model where only a small fraction of agents are unconstrained investors, can match the empirical asset pricing moments.
Another related paper, with different implications though, is Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
They show that aggregate risk is disproportionately borne by the richest, however, they emphasize the role of wages after 1982. My paper shows, however, that most of the risk is borne by the active investors through realized capital income.
There has been increased interest in the volatility of net corporate payouts recently. Larrain and Yogo (2008) show that the high volatility of net payouts can explain the volatility of prices using a present value calculation. Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004) directly model the implications of the highly volatile corporate cash-flow series on the equity premium but dismiss using it as a proxy for the SDF of the marginal investor. However, they concentrate on corporate cash flows which does not take into account that a representative investor can reinvest in private, non-corporate or foreign businesses.
Another strand of literature has emphasized the non-linearity of the Euler equations. However, Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) emphasize the role of rare disasters. This approach has been strongly criticized by Julliard and Ghosh (2008) . They argue that explaining the equity premium with large and infrequent drops in consumption means one cannot explain the cross section of asset returns. The approach in this paper, however, does not rely on rare events and is immune from the above critique.
Large consumption drops are frequent for active investors, given their highly volatile consumption.
Also, this paper does not simply price the assets with factors, an approach criticized by Lewellen et al. (2007) . It does take the theoretical restrictions imposed by a stochastic discount factor seriously, I do not attempt to linearize the model to yield multiple factors but estimate the Euler equation directly. There is no hidden unexplained high risk-free rate, the level of the risk-free return is priced too, not only excess returns. It is important to point out that a linearized model would not be able to match the asset prices, since it is exactly the large consumption drops of active agents that explain the low risk-free rate.
3 Macro data and the consumption of active investors
Different identifying assumptions
Since the consumption expenditure of the richest households is not measured directly, I use macroeconomic flow of funds data to identify the consumption of the active, wealthy investors. I concentrate on wealthy investors, since they are the most likely to make unconstrained investment decisions, they are more likely to be sophisticated and they also have incentives to pay potential participation costs.
This of course does not necessarily mean that all wealthy households are active investors.
I split households into two sets: active and passive. The main assumption is that while active investors manage their portfolios and adjust their consumption in an unconstrained way, passive households do not participate in more complicated markets or follow simple rule of thumb decisions.
One can think of passive households as a household putting a defined sum into its pension fund every month, irrespective of market returns. I do not attempt to explain why these households do not participate actively in the markets, I take it as given. It could be due to participation costs, borrowing constraints, consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2007), or simply irrational beliefs about the expected return and variance on assets (Kézdi and Willis 2008) .
In order to calculate the consumption expenditure of rich households, one needs identifying as-sumptions to separate the two groups of households. I propose three different ways to capture the expenditure of these active households. The first assumption is that the whole production sector is held by these wealthy and active investors, thus cash flows from the production sector, net of reinvestment is used by these households for consumption: this is discussed in Subsection 3.4. The second way is to assume that the income of these active households is already the outcome of an optimal decision, thus income will be consumed completely: see Subsection 3.5. The third path is to look at the portfolio of active agents and calculate the cash-flows resulting from these asset prices, which net of reinvestment should be expenditure on consumption. This last approach is discussed in Subsection 3.6. Note that these series measure consumption expenditures, which in general do not translate directly into utilities: I discuss this point in Subsection 3.7.
The portfolio of active agents
To construct consumption series it is important to understand the main sources of income of active wealthy households. Piketty and Saez (2003) shows that households in the top 1% of the income distribution derive a large fraction of their income from cash-flows of capital investments, at least up to the 1980's. After 1980, there is an increase in the share of wage income, though income related to capital is still high.
The assumption that net equity payout measures the income of the richest households is strongly supported by other studies. Carroll (2000) shows that the richest 1% of households keep more than half of their net worth in equity (corporate or entrepreneurial). Compared to their equity holdings they only keep relatively small positions in transactions and savings accounts, pension funds and life insurance. Given that equity has a substantially higher payoff than other assets, it is reasonable to assume that most of their income is derived from equity.
Data sources
The main data sources are the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables compiled by the 
Payout and expenditure
The basic identifying assumption for the total payout series is that a representative wealthy and active agent owns cash flow claims to the production sector. Larrain and Yogo (2008) have shown that adding up cash flows from bonds and stocks is volatile. If this income is not reinvested, it is must be used for consumption. Since payouts from the nonfinancial corporate sector are net of reinvestment, reinvestment to other asset classes or international flows are the only other reinvestment possibilities.
The simplifying assumption made in case of using total payout is that active households do not actively invest in assets such as government bonds and time and savings deposits.
I use the payout series as the baseline consumption series for active households, since it is most likely to be measured accurately. There are several reasons though why total payout and consumption growth of active households might diverge. Basically I use the two other identifying assumptions, top percentile income and cash flow from portfolio, as a robustness check to show that the basic results are not influenced by the actions of pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies, and by the net flows in and out of government bonds.
After World War II there has been a slow drift in equity holdings: a large part of equity that is not held by the richest individuals is in the hands of life-cycle savers and managed by pension funds and life insurance companies. Thus pension funds could in theory influence the growth of total payout to active investors. Note, however, that if life cycle savers simply put a fixed amount of money into their accounts every year then they have no effect on the annual variability in the growth of total payouts. Also, if pension funds actively managed the stock-bond mix in their portfolios, this would not affect net payouts if they are calculated as the net payout from both stocks and bonds.
Mutual funds have also grown recently and are likely to influence the cash flow from the production sector. A simple calculation based on Carroll (2000) shows that about two-thirds of the assets managed by these funds are those from households who belong to the lower 99% of the wealth distribution.
It is also likely that mutual funds are used by the less active wealthy households, while truly active households hold stocks and bonds directly, or have other kind of managed assets, such as hedge funds.
Note that hedge funds, since they do not report their asset holdings to any agency, show up in the Flow of Funds as stocks and bonds directly held by households. Once again, if the flow of funds into mutual funds is relatively stable over time, it does not affect the variability of payout.
Another question that arises, especially after 1980, whether the working rich who have high and stable wage incomes could influence the results. To adjust for this, I use the top percentile wage income as a proxy for the wage income of active households. Since wage income is far less volatile than income from capital, this is unlikely to affect the consumption growth series, except for making it less volatile. Several different measures for net payout from the corporate sector can be computed. The original measures constructed by Larrain and Yogo (2008) are the following. Equity payout (not including bonds) is adding up net equity issuance and dividends: Tables 1 and 2 for definition of the variables used. The extended measure including bonds includes net issuance of bonds and interest paid on these is what I call payout: and Yogo (2008) show that while pre-1980 net equity payout was predominantly dividendbased, after that lot of payout is realized through equity repurchase, making the series volatile. (2000) show that there is a strong substitution between corporate and entrepreneurial equity, thus entrepreneurial equity is likely to influence asset pricing. Piketty and Saez (2003) also shows that entrepreneurial income is a major source of income rich people, furthermore Carroll (2000) shows that entrepreneurial capital is important in the portfolio of wealthy agents, thus I add income from that to the payout measure, net of capital expenditure. Proprietor's net income is calculated as following:
Heaton and Lucas
P ROP IN C = P ROP + P CCADJ − P ROP CEX where the adjustment for capital consumption has to be added back on to proprietor's income, since the latter is simply an accounting number adjusting for the consumption of capital, it does not represent any cash flows. Reinvestment into entrepreneurial business is measured by proprietor's capital expenditure. Data for P ROP CEX is not available before 1946, so I calculate it as a fixed fraction of total private non-residential investment from NIPA. Given that the relative size of entrepreneurial investment to total non-residential investment is 0.26 in the years 1946-1955, proprietor's net income is calculated as:
Note that FFA reports investment of non-farm non-corporate equity, but this series P ROP CEX is calculated as a residual (Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts 2000): aggregate investment minus the investment of all other sectors. Thus it picks up all the measurement errors and is likely to be imprecise, still it is the best measure we have. One should note that private net equity payout to the owners is extremely hard to measure and lots of perks which the owners enjoy as consumption, e.g. the use of a private company jet, never show up in the data as payout, thus the real payout to the owners of private equity is probably more volatile than suggested by the FFA data.
I use the data of Larrain and Yogo (2008 Yogo ( ) for 1929 Yogo ( -1945 since this is not available in the FFA accounts. Since the goal of this paper is to use macroeconomic data to infer the expenditure of a representative active domestic households, I make adjustments after 1946, where FFA data is already available. 2 First, adjustment for net inflows and outflows of corporate equities and bonds from the US is made. To adjust for dividend flows in and out of the US, the original dividend measure of Larrain and Yogo (2008) is changed to the net domestic dividend income measure DIV DP of NIPA. This series includes net flows of profits from foreign direct investment and dividends from financial firms but excludes dividends paid to financial firms and from 1968, that paid to private pension funds. 3
The final total equity payout series T EP is calculated using the following expression:
The last four terms add the net equity payout of commercial banks and brokers and dealers, who contributed substantially to the increase in payout from the 1980's onward. The series including bonds is the total payout, the baseline series used in this paper:
Where the last eight terms add the net equity and bond payout of commercial banks and brokers and dealers. The term "total" is used to denote series that include proprietor's income and wages of high earning households. There is no straightforward way of measuring the wage income of active wealthy agents but the top percentile earners' wage series T P W is a reasonable proxy. Note that it is not available for 2006 and 2007, so these two values are replaced with the number from 2004. Given that wages are much less volatile that capital gains, it is unlikely that this would influence the results.
The main assumption of this paper is that active households must consume their income after reinvestment which has been paid out to them by corporate and non-corporate sector, i.e. that they cannot smooth their income through buying government bonds for example. The other two identifying assumptions, however, take this possibility into account thus they can be viewed as a robustness check to the baseline consumption series.
It is useful to check whether the constructed consumption series of the wealthy active agents is indeed a reasonable consumption series. Table 3 reports the mean and the standard deviation of the series of the T P and the T EP series. The series concentrated solely on equity is more volatile than that including cash flows from bonds. Some goods are mostly or exclusively consumed by the wealthy.
Using data of the luxuries sales index constructed using the sales of 7 luxury good retailers from Aït-Sahalia et al. (2004) , 4 one gets a relatively strong comovement of payout and luxury expenditures (see Figure 3 ). The correlation is clearly positive, though both series are likely to be measured with noise. The higher mean of luxury retail growth could possibly be a gain in market share of e.g. Tiffany used in the index.
At a first glance a standard deviation of 9 − 13% of consumption expenditure of wealthy and active agents in the economy seems unreasonable. One expects that these agents are the ones who are most likely to be able to smooth their consumption over time. However unconstrained optimization does not automatically mean smoothing, especially if one's lifetime net worth fluctuates a lot from one period to the other. Active wealthy agents' main constituent of lifetime net worth is not their human capital but their physical wealth which consists of more than 50% equity (Carroll 2000) . Even their human capital is largely the ability to manage their equity capital. Thus if the value of equity follows a random walk with an annual standard deviation of about 20%, then 9 − 13% annual consumption fluctuation seems reasonable.
Income and expenditure
To make sure our measure of net equity payout captures the income growth of the active wealthy households it is useful to compare the net equity payout growth series with the income of top earners.
Piketty and Saez (2003) construct top incomes from 1913 in the US based on data from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). Since the richest 1% of households owns more than 50% of total equity, both corporate and entrepreneurial, directly or indirectly, 5 the relevant income series to compare with net equity payout will be that of the top 1% tax filers as of their income. They are also likely to be active households. Capital gains will be included in the income series analyzed (T P I), since equity repurchases are an important way of paying out corporate profits.
Note that taxable income is different from our measure of net payout which takes reinvestment into equity and bonds into account. The income measure based on IRS only partially nets out reinvestment.
If for example the corporation owned by the household reinvests its profits, then reinvestment is netted out in the income series. If, however, the household uses capital gains from one corporation to invest in another one or in a different asset class, the reinvestment will in general not be subtracted from the income. However, it is reasonable to assume that wealthy individuals might find ways not to have to realize capital gains they are going to reinvest. Figure 4 shows how closely the income of the top 1% of earners T P I tracks total payout T P . This is only due to a small extent to the fact that the same wage series are included in both measures. In fact, wages were not a large fraction of income of wealthy households before the 1980's (Piketty and Saez 2006). The only extreme outliers are 1930, 1986 and 1987 . This also highlights the weakness of this measure, since some fluctuations are due to reporting income in a tricky way to avoid taxes. The latter two could be related to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which had large effects on the wealthiest households. Otherwise the one-for-one relationship between the two variables highlights that the macroeconomic approach to the consumption expenditure of active households measure through T P is in close relationship with the microeconomic approach of aggregating households' income data.
It also shows that reinvesting realized capital gains is unlikely to be a serious problem at least for the corporate and entrepreneurial sector. Note that neither series accounts for reinvestment in bank account and federal and municipal bonds. The last income series CF P , the cash flow calculated from portfolio holdings of active agents, described in Subsection 3.6, partially addresses these problems. One important caveat is to be mentioned. Both the total payout series and the top percentile income series are before personal income tax and there have been major changes in the rate of income tax for high income households. A manifestation of this is the high discrepancy between net equity payout around the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 6 Gordon and Slemrod (2000) argue that taxes may have sizable effects on taxable income because of shifts between corporate, entrepreneurial and wage income in case of closely held companies. However, Piketty and Saez (2007) It is also important to keep in mind that top percentile income is not a time series of a given set of households. Top percentile is always defined in the given year, thus households whose income drops too much fall out of the top percentile, while others with good income draws that year enter the top percentile. This means that the top percentile income series understates consumption volatility for the wealthiest active households as a group. Also, individual households will in general have higher risks, since there might be uninsurable idiosyncratic risks due to e.g. having a privately managed company.
Since luxury sales growth comove with payouts and have similar volatility, it seems plausible that payouts are indeed consumed. Another argument to support this statement is that firms would not pay out their profits if owners would not want to spend it. Owners could always opt for reinvesting the profits and reinvestments are taken into account in the net payout measure of this paper.
Cash flow from portfolio and expenditure
Another way to verify the validity of total payout as a consumption series is to look directly at cash flows from household portfolios. A simple identifying strategy to separate active and passive households is to categorize portfolio items as either active or passive. A good starting point is to look at the portfolio holdings of wealthy households since they are more likely to be active investors. Also, asset classes that are likely to have larger fixed or informational costs of managing are more likely to be held by active agents. I propose a simple categorization in this subsection.
Passive households who predominantly save for retirement or precautionary reasons, mainly have the following assets: transaction and savings deposits, certificate of deposits, US savings bonds, primary residence, money market mutual funds, life insurance, private and public pension funds. Their liabilities are mostly consumer loans and home mortgages.
Active households who have assets as a source of income and do not simply save for life-cycle reasons, predominantly have the following assets: directly held equity, corporate and foreign bonds, treasuries, municipal bonds, equity in non-corporate business (proprietary equity), accounts at investment banks and brokers (security credit), hedge funds, and venture capital. If they have any liabilities directly, it is likely to be ones directly linked to the proprietary business they own, such as bank loans and mortgage loans to non-farm non-corporate businesses. One, however, should nevertheless keep in mind that active households are also potentially indebted towards passive households through the bonds and loans taken by the corporations they own. One does not have to take this into account when calculating household level cash flows, since it is already taken care of at the level of corporate businesses.
Non-profit organizations, such as endowments, are also likely to be like active households, who do consumption adjustments depending on asset prices. One just has to recall university endowments adjusting to the sharp drop in asset values in 2008. In the Flow of Funds data these entities are merged with households, so all consumption series cover them as well. Endowments own asset classes that usual households do not, such as commercial paper and they are also eligible to issue municipal bonds.
Mutual funds are probably the hardest to classify. Although they have been a major vehicle in broadening the base of equity ownership, some wealthy households have also used it as a device to diversify investments. A simple calculation based on Carroll (2000) shows that about 1/3 of the assets in mutual funds are held by the richest 1% of households. However, it is likely that the most active households hold equities directly since they can forego the costs of paying a mutual fund manager. Also, they are likely to invest in hedge funds instead of mutual funds. Note that since hedge funds do not report asset positions to any authority, their holdings and cash flows end up in the residual in the Flow of Funds accounts, that is with households.
The consumption series based on cash flows from assets likely to be held by active wealthy households, cash flow from portfolio, is denoted as CF P and computed in the following way. I use the classification of assets classes described before. To calculate the interest received on assets, I approximate the interest rate by the average of the interest rate at the beginning of the year and the end of the year, where lag denotes values lagged by one year. Top percentile wages and proprietor's income is also added. For years before 1946, when there is no Flow of Funds data, so I replace the CF P series by the total payout series of T P . This seems appropriate given that up to the 1950's equity was almost all directly held by households and there was a much smaller variety of other asset classes. Using the alternative of T EP for this period does not lead to substantially different results, since the growth of the two payout series are very close before 1950. The only problematic period is during World War II since households directly bought large amounts of government bonds, however, there is no straightforward way to adjust for this, since passive households may have purchased government bonds directly too.
The main advantage of using this consumption series is that it adjusts for changes in holdings of federal and municipal bonds of rich households, since even though it is a small fraction of their net worth (Carroll 2000) , it may be used to smooth income fluctuations. This series also ensures that the results are not driven by cash flow changes to pension funds and mutual funds. Note that it is not possible to adjust for in-and outflows into savings deposits, since this asset is predominantly held by the inactive. Active wealthy households could potentially use these accounts to manage their liquidity.
Given though that I concentrate on annual data, this is less likely to be a problem, since treasuries in general yield a higher interest rate, so they are more likely to be used beyond one year. Table 3 shows that the consumption measure based on cash flow from portfolio CF P is more volatile than the other two measures. This could be due to two factors. One is that, unfortunately, the Flow of Funds data for asset holdings of households and non-profit organizations (FFA Table   F .100) is calculated as a residual (Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts 2000) and thus seems noisier than the previous two series, total payout and top percentile income. The other factor is that this series might be better at capturing the truly active investors, while the volatility of the other two consumption might be attenuated by including wealthy individuals who do not actively manage their portfolio and consumption. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 one sees that the CF P measure seems to comove better with the market when the backward timing convention is used, while T P comoves more using the forward timing convention. For more on timing convention, see Section 4.1. Table 4 shows the correlations between the different measures of consumption: the CF P series is the least correlated with the other measures of the consumption of active agents, most likely because of the high measurement error which also manifests in the negative autocorrelation of this series.
Expenditure and utility
All above measures of consumption are measures of consumption expenditure and not necessarily consumption. The two can deviate substantially if changes in consumption expenditure are due to durables or housing investment. However, housing investment of the wealthy is unlikely to adjust at a high frequency, since the construction is a long-term project. Unfortunately the data does not allow us to calculate how much of the income of the rich is spent on durables and how much on non-durables, e.g. exotic vacations and fancy dinners. Durables are likely to be consumed by wealthy households: many expensive luxuries such as yachts, jewelry, helicopters are in effect durables. While this is likely to influence the results, there are several reasons why the results presented in this paper are unlikely to be driven by not taking durability into account.
First, even if durables are consumed by these households, if the shocks to their wealth is relatively permanent, they will adjust the consumption of both durables and non-durables together. Second, lots of luxury durables consumed by wealthy households, such as fancy bags and clothes, are in effect non-durables from their point of view, since fashion changes fast. The resale value of these durables is likely to be very low, since most of their value is being new and fashionable. Third, there is a behavioral explanation too: if wealthy active households derive utility from spending or from social status linked directly to expenditure (conspicuous consumption) or even donations, then again expenditure is reasonable measure of their consumption.
Share of active consumption
While this paper does not attempt to explain the time variation in expected stock returns, it does give an interesting insight. If the consumption share and the fraction of aggregate economic risk borne by active agents changes over time, then expected returns on assets held by active agents, such as stock will change. Intuitively when the risk-bearing capacity of active households increases, then expected stock returns in the long run should be lower. Figure 6 shows that, given our crude measure, it seems that the consumption of active agents is around 20% of national income, however, it slowly varies over time. This gives a potential explanation of the success of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) who put forth an argument based on habit formation: the habit level can be interpreted as the consumption of the passive households in the economy (Guvenen 2008).
To draw conclusions on lung-run predictability, one would need a general equilibrium model to incorporate actions of passive households. For example the increased demand by active households for equity and corporate bonds for their life-cycle saving might influence long-run stock prices too.
One observation, that is an interesting starting point for future research is that low levels of active consumption share in the 1970's and early 1980's was followed by high expected returns on stocks, while the high consumption share of the late 1990's and early 2000's is now followed by low expected returns in the markets. Since the structure of the economy changed a lot after 1930, such straightforward conclusions are hard to draw for the whole sample.
If indeed a small fraction of active households bear a large fraction of aggregate risk, it is important to look at the consumption volatility of passive households. Figure 7 shows the consumption growth of passive households and compares it to aggregate consumption growth. The calculated residual consumption growth is close to the aggregate value, however, it looks slightly more volatile. There are two potential reasons for this. First, any measurement error in the consumption of active households automatically makes the calculated residual consumption growth more volatile. Second, aggregate risk is not the only source of risk in the economy, redistributional shocks affect both the consumption of the active and the passive but do not necessarily change the volatility of aggregate consumption.
Figures 9 and 10 make it apparent that recessions can be very different: they show the consumption growth of the active and the passive first using the total payout measure, then the top percentile income measure. While the Great Depression and the oil crises of the 1970's had similar effects on both the active and the passive, the recessions of 1945, 1969, 1990 , and 2001 almost exclusively effected active households. Clearly, redistributional shocks do not only effect the downside: e.g. the financial boom of the mid 2000's seems to have only benefited the active. These results shed light on why the variation in total consumption expenditure cannot explain the variation in asset prices. Not only is the total consumption growth much less volatile than that of active households (see Figure 8 ) but some aggregate shocks are strongly redistributional while others are not.
The crisis of 2008
While not all data is available for the year 2008 yet, it is interesting to analyze those already out.
Payouts dropped dramatically over 2008, even though the bulk of the crisis only hit in September.
While dividends did not change substantially, net equity repurchase in the non-financial corporate sector more than halved from 831 billion in 2007 to 395 in 2008. Some of this was offset by the drop in bond issuance however: from 311 billion to 204 billion. In the financial sector the drop was even more dramatic: instead of paying out around 300 billion (mainly in equity repurchase) as was the case in 2007, the financial sector sucked in a vast 900 billion dollars. Note however that a large chunk of the equity was provided by the federal government, this has to be taken into account when making the calculations. Given that total payout stood at close to 4 trillion in 2007 and that bonuses also dropped dramatically, it seems that the consumption expenditure of active households probably experienced its largest drops since the beginning of the data in 1930, somewhere around 20-30%. These numbers make the stock market crash of 2008 a reasonable response, especially since much of the bonuses and profits, especially from excessive risk taking in banking will be curbed by government regulation in the future: active households probably perceive their drop in consumption long-lasting. Breeden et al. (1989) show that time-aggregation is an important issue in estimating Euler equations: in this paper, I test different timing assumptions. Using the continuous time setup used by the authors, one can easily show that the change in time-aggregated annual consumption from year t − 1 to t does not equally load on all innovations during that time period. For example new information at the end of December in year t is fully reflected in asset prices but basically does not change the annual growth rate of time-aggregated consumption, since there are only a few days left of the year which only bear a small weight in the annual data. It is not straightforward, however, which of these timing conventions is best if the standard deviation of the innovations changes over time, e.g. like in a ARCH model. It has been the standard in the literature to use one-period ahead consumption growth rates (forward convention) instead of growth rates from the past period to the present period (backward convention) because they do better empirically, even though in theory they should both do equally well (Parker and Julliard 2005) . The use of future payout growth information could be important in light of the fact shown by Bansal and Yaron (2007) that a lot of asset price variation is due to predictable payout growth. Thus information instantaneously reflected in the stock price will only show up in the time-aggregated payout series in the future. This paper also uses the two year growth rate from previous year t − 1 to the future year t + 1 to capture all the innovations in the consumption series due to information during the whole year t. Figure 11 intuitively shows how different consumption growth measures load on innovations at different times during a year. A different approach, suggested by Hall (1988) , would be to do a triangular weighting of returns over the past year and the current year.
GMM estimates of the Euler equation 4.1 Timing convention
However, this relies heavily on the assumption that news about income and expenditure is realized at the same rate over the year, an assumption which is unlikely to hold in light of the findings of Jagannathan and Wang (2007) that last-quarter consumption growth is much better at explaining the cross-section of asset prices than annual averages: most of the consumption adjustment seems to be made in the fourth quarter.
Theoretically a time-aggregated consumption series should have a first-order autocorrelation of 0.25 (for a derivation see e.g. Breeden et al. (1989) ). Table 3 shows that the autocorrelation of measured total consumption expenditure series is above 0.25, somewhat higher than predicted by theory. However the autocorrelation of series for consumption of active households payout series is lower, or in case of the cash flow of portfolio, even slightly negative. This may be due to measurement errors in the level of these series which then translate into a smaller autocorrelation in growths. This measurement error in consumption growth could bias the estimates of parameters when estimating the Euler equation. Section 4.5 shows that these biases are unlikely to influence the main results substantially.
Euler equations and moment conditions
The ultimate test of the model is whether it implies reasonable preference parameters for the active investor. Following Yogo (2006) the test portfolios in the conditional model are the excess market return, the HML and SMB factors. The fourth equation is the Euler equation for the risk-free real return. Using all 25 Fama-French portfolios as test portfolios would lead to a plethora of moment conditions and exacerbate the problem of having a small sample. Since the 25 portfolios have a strong factor structure, the long-run variance estimator would be hard to estimate too, since it entails inverting a matrix the size of which grows with the number of moment conditions. The moment conditions for the unconditional GMM are E [ t+1 ] = 0, where the vector of errors is:
Where the objective function is: use VARHAC restricted to an autoregression on own lags. The number of lags in the VAR is set to 2.
The Newey-West estimator yields similar results and is not reported separately. this is basically the cause of the equity premium puzzle.
Implied preference parameters
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results for the GMM estimation for the full sample, while Tables 8   and 9 report the results on the post-war sample. For all series all timing conventions are tested. For the forward and backward convention, the estimated risk aversion is divided by two to adjust for the time-aggregation bias. The estimated γ is low compared to previous studies, in the range of 2-10 for the timing conventions that are not rejected or do not yield implausible values for β. These γ's are highlighted in the table. Also note that Hansen's J-test for over-identifying restrictions does not reject either of the models based on consumption series of active investors, for at least one timing convention.
Using total consumption series, i.e. basically the representative agent framework, yields high estimates of risk-aversion for the post-war sample of over 20, however, it does not yield an unreasonably high level for the series including the Great Depression. Why have previous papers found much higher estimates? There are several reasons. First, including the consumption catastrophe of the Great Depression yields a spike in the SDF in this non-linear setup which helps explain high equity returns.
Second, I estimate the discount factor jointly with the risk-aversion and the resulting discount factor in case of total consumption expenditure is always in the implausible range of β > 1. This high discount factor means the equity premium is not resolved using total consumption: it simply hides the result that the data cannot match the low levels of the risk-free rate, since R f ∼ 1 β , if it accommodates the high return on equities.
The risk aversion parameter estimates might still seem high compared to the parameters 2-4 which are thought of as reasonable based on micro evidence. One might even expect lower values for wealthy households. The estimates of this paper could be upward biased for several reasons. First, Monte Carlo simulations in Subsection 4.5 show that the risk aversion parameter will be slightly upward biased. Second, if there are passive but wealthy households, the above measures are likely to be upward biased. Third, all consumption series above are aggregated for all active households. Thus if they hold some idiosyncratic risk, as many active households managing private firms do, then the risk aversion coefficient is again upward biased since it is based on aggregate consumption. As Constantinides and Duffie (1996) show, uninsured idiosyncratic risk can make the risk aversion of a representative agent, in this case representative active household, look higher.
The different estimated stochastic discount factors are shown in Figures 12, 14 , and 16. It is clear that the stochastic discount factor for active investors spikes at recessions such as 1930, 1945, 1969, 1973, 2001 . This illustrates that the convexity of the Euler equation is important in understanding the equity premium and the low risk-free rate. It is clear, however, that in large recessions, the SDF is very sensitive to measurement errors due to the strong non-convexity. While all recessions show up using all consumption measures, they weigh the severity of recessions differently. Using T P the severest recession is 1945, using T P I the Great Depression dwarfs all other recessions, while using CF P , it is the recessions of 1969 and 1973 that dominate. These results show how important it is to get a less noisy measure of the consumption of active households.
Tables 6-9 also report the root mean square pricing errors (RMSE) over the times series standard errors for each moment condition separately in the estimation. The closer RMSE is to 0, as opposed to 1, the more of the time series variation in the moments can the stochastic discount factor explain.
In general, the preferred timing conventions do very well in explaining the time series variation of the market returns and the riskless rate. The time variation in the HML factor is the one that these series can explain the least.
Why do some timing conventions perform better than others? One possible explanation, supported by the results of Jagannathan and Wang (2007) , is that consumption decisions are timed at the end of the year. This could be even stronger for wealthy investors, since capital gains and bonuses are frequently realized at the end of the year. This would mean that the forward and two-period timing conventions should do better. Interestingly, the backward timing does better for T P I and CF P : there is no straightforward explanation for this.
The discount factors estimated for the active households seem low for most consumption series: mostly in the range of 0.65-0.85. The reason for this is that we are estimating a non-linear Eulerequation and measurement error in the consumption series yields estimates for β that are substantial downward biased. The Monte Carlo simulation of Subsection 4.5 illustrates this point.
Matching the cross-section of returns
If the series for consumption growth of active investors indeed yields a stochastic discount factor then it should explain the cross-sectional differences in expected stock returns. To assess whether the resulting SDF indeed prices the cross section of asset returns, I use the 25 Fama-French portfolios sorted by size and value (Fama and French 1993) .
Most studies use linear regressions on the proposed factors to price the cross-section of returns and include a constant α that by theory should be zero if the stochastic discount factor were used. 7 This approach has been criticized Lewellen et al. (2007) . Furthermore, they show that the cross-sectional R 2 is a weak test for the validity of a factor pricing model, since any single factor that is correlated with the three Fama-French factors can be used to reasonably price the cross-section of stock returns. The intuition underlying this result is that the Fama-French portfolios have a strong two-factor structure.
Thus two factors correlated with SMB and HML are always enough to price the market and even a single factor is enough if it is correlated with SMB and HML with the proper weights.
To address the criticism of Lewellen et al. (2007) , I take the restrictions imposed on a SDF seriously.
I use the stochastic discount factor, with the estimated preference parameters from the GMM, directly to calculate the expected excess return R e i on each of the portfolios i:
, R e i Figure 13 shows the predicted and realized returns on the 25 portfolios based on the baseline consumption series of total payout R 2 is 59.4% for the whole sample period, while the T EP series preforms similarly well in the post-war period. This is lower than those in previous studies but keep in mind that I take pricing the level of the risk free rate seriously, use parameters estimated form the time series, and I only use a single factor. Other factors do not do as well, but still mostly yield positive R 2 's; note that taking the SDF seriously means it is very easy to get strongly negative R 2 's. There is a concern regarding the small growth portfolio, which has the lowest expected return among all 25 portfolios but is not explained by the stochastic discount factor. Given that this portfolio is hard to short and thus prone to bubbles and sentiment (Baker and Wurgler 2006), one does not in general expect that it is priced correctly. I also report R 2 's dropping this portfolio but the results do not change substantially. Figures 15 and 17 show the cross-sectional implications for the other two consumption series, both with the preferred timing convention.
I also run a Monte Carlo experiment using real asset price data and a random consumption growth to make sure that noise cannot yield the results I get for the consumption series of active consumers. I generate 10, 000 draws, of length 77 years each (60 for the post-war sample), of uncorrelated artificial consumption growth data. I draw the values from a normal distribution with a mean of 2% and standard deviation 10%, close to that of the T P series. Tables 7 and 9 show that a model with a purely noisy consumption cannot pin down the risk aversion: the standard errors of the estimates are large. Also, it is almost impossible to achieve positive R 2 with a purely noisy measure. Since the estimates based on the consumption series of the wealthy mostly yield positive R 2 's for at least one timing convention, it is unlikely that the results are driven simply by using a volatile consumption series. However, the Monte Carlo experiment does show that the noise in measuring consumption can lead to deteriorating cross-sectional implications, an effect I analyze using artificial data in Subsection 4.5.
New evidence by Asness et al. (2008) shows that combining value and momentum strategies in different asset classes yields high and very smooth abnormal returns which is unlikely to be explained by any reasonable stochastic discount factor. In light of this evidence it is not clear how seriously one should take trying to price the value premium. Looking in detail at which of the portfolios is priced well by the stochastic discount factor, it is clear that the HML factor is the hardest to match, while the excess return on the market and SMB are relatively easier tasks.
Another suggestion made by Lewellen et al. (2007) is to use the 30 industry-sorted portfolios along with the 25 Fama-French portfolios when testing cross-sectional implications. They show that basically all factor models proposed hitherto do poorly in this respect. The factor proposed in this paper is no exception. Whether this means that the proposed consumption series does not capture the stochastic discount factor, or that the data series is too short and the expected return differences between industry portfolios not large enough, cannot be determined based on the results.
Monte Carlo simulations
The measurement error in consumption growth introduces some bias in the estimation of the coefficients. The reason is that with risk aversion γ > 1 the stochastic discount factor is a convex function of consumption growth. Most studies that estimate Euler equations do not have to deal with this problem, since the Euler equation is linearized. However, with a linearized Euler equation the occasional large drops in consumption do not have a large effect on the stochastic discount factor, something which I argue should not be neglected.
For every draw in the Monte Carlo simulation, I generate a set of observed consumption growth and return series of length T = 77 which corresponds to the length of the full series. First, I generate a true log consumption process c t :
where of g c = 1.5% and ν t is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of σ ν = 8%. The observed consumption is then calculated in the following way:
where is an observation error and drawn i.i.d. from a normal zero mean distribution with standard deviation of σ = 6%. Having a weighted average of present and past true consumption basically reproduces the effect of time aggregation: half of the information content in observed consumption growth comes from the last period, while half from the present period (see Figure 11 ). The growth of the consumption variables are defined as ∆c t = c t − c t−1 and ∆ĉ t =ĉ t −ĉ t−1 . The risk-free rate is assumed to be constant and calculated based on a consumption path of length 10, 000:
The excess returns of an asset with consumption-beta of b i are generated based on the true consumption series:
where µ is a observation error, e.g. due to liquidity effects with zero mean and standard deviation values are all set to give time series properties values similar to that of the empirical series. Based on 10, 000 simulations, the risk free rate is R f = 3.81%, the mean and volatility of excess return on the market, the return with b = 1, is 4.23% and 22.3%, respectively. The volatility of observed consumption is 10.2%.
To assess how serious the bias is, I run the same GMM estimation on the Monte Carlo simulations as on the real observed series. I include 4 moment conditions: one on the risk-free rate and three on the excess returns on the 3 portfolios. The findings are reported in Table 5 . I find that the bias on the risk aversion coefficient is upward but small, but there is a substantial skewness: large γ's are possible. The results also show that the naive way of dividing the estimated risk aversion by two, to adjust for the time aggregation bias, works well. Since the risk aversion is the main interest of the study, this is reassuring. The bias on the discount factor is substantial and downward but this is not the coefficient we are mainly interested in. This result is in line with the theoretical result of Lettau et al. (forthcoming) that noise in a log-linear consumption process only biases the estimate of β. The simulation also shows that one should not be worried about low or even slightly negative R 2 's, the estimation procedure is unlikely to yield very high R 2 's, the mean is only 39.5%.
Conclusions and implications for further research
This paper shows how to use macroeconomic data to back out the consumption series of active wealthy households who are likely to manage their investments and consumptions actively over time and are not likely to be constrained. The consumption growth of the representative active investor has an annual standard deviation of 9-15%. I argue that if most of an active investor's wealth is in equities, such a high number is not unreasonable.
I use the consumption series to price the time series and cross section of asset returns. I find that it yields reasonable risk aversion estimates and can, to some extent, explain the cross section returns on size and value sorted portfolios. The pricing equations are derived from the stochastic discount factor directly and the Euler equations are not linearized. The paper shows that the non-linearity of the stochastic discount factor is indeed important since large consumption drops for these households are relatively frequent.
The question of why such a disproportionate amount of risk in the economy is borne by active agents is an important question for further research. It has long puzzled economists why the expected return on the stock market varied over time. Since both the amount of risk and the risk bearing capacity, i.e. consumption of active agents, varies over time depending on political and economic developments, the approach proposed by this paper could eventually help shed light on the time variation in expected stock returns. This insight is important from a policy perspective since political institutions such as taxes and wage rigidity have a large impact on how volatile equity income is. Figure 1: Total payout growth and excess market return The total payout growth is the T P measure of the consumption of active agents. The graph is based on the forward timing convention, since it fits market excess return better than the backward convention. 
forward: two-period: Figure 11 : Theoretical weights on continuous innovation of different series Assuming prices and consumption are a random walk (Breeden et al. 1989) , the weights different timeaggregated variables put on innovations at different times is depicted. A weight of 1 means the timeaggregated observation fully reflects the innovation of that infinitesimal moment. In theory all three timing conventions should be useful in consumption based asset pricing. Table 5 : Parameter estimates based on artificial data The estimates are based on 10, 000 artificial consumption and return samples, each of length 77 years. The true preference parameter used to generate the data are β = 0.98 and γ = 2.5. The p-value is computed based on J-stat computed using two degrees of freedom. Standard errors are calculated by a VARHAC estimator. R 2 refers to the cross-sectional pricing of the excess returns of 25 portfolios using the stochastic discount factor. Annual data. I highlight the preferred timing convention and the risk aversion for the specifications which are not rejected (based on p-value and reasonable β). Standard errors are calculated by a VARHAC estimator. R 2 refers to the cross-sectional pricing of the excess returns on the 25 Fama-French size and value sorted portfolios using the stochastic discount factor. "excl. 11" means dropping the small growth portfolio. J-stat computed using two degrees of freedom. The last four columns report the root mean squared pricing error for each of the four moment conditions as a fraction of the time series standard deviation of that given moment condition. Annual data. I highlight the preferred timing convention and the risk aversion for the specifications which are not rejected (based on p-value and reasonable β). Standard errors are calculated by a VARHAC estimator. R 2 refers to the cross-sectional pricing of the excess returns on the 25 Fama-French size and value sorted portfolios using the stochastic discount factor. "excl. 11" means dropping the small growth portfolio. J-stat computed using two degrees of freedom. The random series is generated by Monte Carlo with similar time series properties as the actual consumption measures. The last four columns report the root mean squared pricing error for each of the four moment conditions as a fraction of the time series standard deviation of that given moment condition. They should equal zero if the portfolio is correctly priced by the SDF. Annual data. I highlight the preferred timing convention and the risk aversion for the specifications which are not rejected (based on p-value and reasonable β). Standard errors are calculated by a VARHAC estimator. R 2 refers to the cross-sectional pricing of the excess returns on the 25 Fama-French size and value sorted portfolios using the stochastic discount factor. "excl. 11" means dropping the small growth portfolio. J-stat computed using two degrees of freedom. The last four columns report the root mean squared pricing error for each of the four moment conditions as a fraction of the time series standard deviation of that given moment condition. Annual data. I highlight the preferred timing convention and the risk aversion for the specifications which are not rejected (based on p-value and reasonable β). Standard errors are calculated by a VARHAC estimator. R 2 refers to the cross-sectional pricing of the excess returns on the 25 Fama-French size and value sorted portfolios using the stochastic discount factor. "excl. 11" means dropping the small growth portfolio. J-stat computed using two degrees of freedom. The random series is generated by Monte Carlo with similar time series properties as the actual consumption measures. The last four columns report the root mean squared pricing error for each of the four moment conditions as a fraction of the time series standard deviation of that given moment condition. They should equal zero if the portfolio is correctly priced by the SDF.
